[2021.11.3] 어떻게 Exit 할 것인가?

저자는 캄보디아에 WaterSHED라는 NGO를 세우고 식수 관련 사업을 하면서

 어떻게 Exit 했는가에 대한 경험을 소개한다. 

어쩌다 보니 프로젝트 마지막 연도에 사업관리 책임을 몇 번 맡게 되다 보니 늘 궁금한 것이 바로 이 Exit이었다.

물론 Exit은 사업을 계획하는 순간부터 함께 고려되고 사업 수행 내내 염두에 두고 다루어져야 하는 것이라
마지막년도에 어찌어찌한다 해서 잘 되는 것은 아니지만 
처음부터 고민했다 하더라도 참 어려운 일인 것 같다. 

그래서 이 글을 관심있게 잘 읽었고, 중요한 부분을 기억해두고 싶어서 정리해보기로 함 

(Illustration Courtesy of WaterSHED) 

https://ssir.org/articles/entry/exit_strategies#

Exit Strategies (SSIR)

 

Exit-Planning Is Useful in Its Own Right

(생략)...

If you continue supplying clean water or new hand pumps without tackling the underlying issues, you would almost certainly be consigned to a forever war on the lack of access to clean water. 

 

 (맞다. Tackling the underlying issues!

그러나 실상 underlying issues를 발견하고 해결하는 것은 정말 쉽지는 않다 ㅠㅠ)

(생략)...

For this reason, people in the development sector should think as much about how to close their NGOs as they do about how to start, manage, and grow them. Otherwise, NGOs and their programs will overwhelmingly continue to alleviate symptoms rather than strengthen underlying systems.

 

 (근본적인 시스템보다 보여지는 현상과 상황 대응에만 머무르기 쉬운 위험을 지적한다)

 

A Touchstone for Strategy and Discipline

Planning our exit not only forced us to address the big questions, it also served as a guide when making day-to-day decisions about program implementation, enforcing the discipline to avoid offering direct services (which is a tantalizingly simple way to achieve short-term results).

 

(물론 응급 인도지원적인 맥락에서는 달리 봐야 하지만

Simple direct services 에 대한 뼈 아픈 고찰을 해보게 된다.)

 

(생략)...

 

Having an exit plan was also like erecting a guardrail to prevent us from doing direct service provision. My colleagues used to joke about how we should “get into that business,” meaning we should deliver products or services directly to beneficiaries and be measured on value-for-money. “How much simpler that would be!” But our team knew that we always had to answer two questions: how our job would be done, and by whom, after WaterSHED was gone.

 

(점점 더 궁금해지기 시작한다. 우리도 알고는 있지.

거의 모든 프로젝트가 기한이 있기 때문에 Exit을 기준으로 목표와 활동을 계획한다만,

WaterSHED는 구체적으로 어떻게 했는지 궁금해진다.)

The Value of Communicating Your Exit

A transparently planned exit strategy creates an opportunity to telegraph intent. We found tremendous value in simply sharing the exit goal with our partners.

 

(파트너와 프로젝트의 Exit 목표를 아무리 나누어도 요동치 않는 벽이 현장에 있긴 있다.

하지만, 목표를 공유하는 것은 기본적이기도 하면서 중요하긴 하다. 

나누는 것으로 충분하지 않고, 이게 어떤 의미인지를 모두가 같은 이해를 하고 있는지도 확인을 해야 한다.)

 

Because very few NGOs voluntarily plot their own demise—and everybody knows that NGOs continue until they run out of funding—few took us seriously when we first declared our intention for WaterSHED to exit within a defined period. Even some staff doubted it! Most stakeholders and observers initially thought that we meant it metaphorically, or as some kind of lofty, long-term goal that would always be just over the horizon.

 

The problem is that, since exiting is rarely pursued as a goal, the default expectation among stakeholders is that NGOs offer an open-ended commitment. Without a defined endpoint or a metric that triggers the end, the NGO is implicitly locked in a permanent role that is performed with resources provided from abroad. This contributes to a dependency mindset among local partners. And among the many problems of this dependency mindset is, of course, the inevitable fact that foreign funding is never sustainable.

 

(현장에서 정부 공무원이나 마을 주민들이 흔히 갖게 되는 기대가

바로 an open-ended commitment인 것 같다.

Dependency mindset과 싸우는게 사업 수행 자체보다 더 힘들다.)

 

When our partners internalized that we really would be exiting, it instantly, palpably changed the way they thought about our respective roles. For one thing, it forced them (and us) to think about how things would be done afterward, longer-term. That simple shift provoked an immensely powerful new mindset that I believe is necessary for successful development: a focus on sustainability. Without it, the difficult considerations (who should pay, who should do, and who should own in the long term) can be forever deferred, despite nice-sounding commitments to sustainability.

 

(파트너들이 Exit을 내재화하게 되면, 그들이 장기적인 지속가능성에 대해 생각하게 된다는 요지이다.

이론상으로는 정말 맞는 말이지만 이런 논리가 먹히지 않는 상황들이 많아서 참 안타깝다.

결국은 '무기력'과 '의존성'을 해결해야 할 텐데

이렇게 중요한 소프트한 변화와 성장보다

건물이나 도로 등 눈에 보이는 변화에 더 많은 투자를 요청받게 될 때도 많다.)

 

Stakeholder Perceptions

(We encountered a multitude of reactions over the years. But how the partners react will make or break the success of the exit and ultimately determine the long-term sustainability of impact.

 

(생략)...But they expressed concern about investing in an organization that would soon be gone, as though it would be a waste. 

 

(생략)...

 

The funders who backed WaterSHED had to take more risk supporting an NGO that would exit as compared to funding a predictable output machine. ...They saw our exit plan as the logical conclusion of our program, and as a signal that we were very focused on our mission rather than continuously searching for new areas of work. Invariably these donors did not expect recognition. In fact, it was a sign of misalignment if a donor needed a plaque or banner to thank them—not least because our system-strengthening work generated few things on which a plaque could be placed.

 

(이 부분은 모든 NGO가 스스로 평가하며 되돌아봐야 하는 질문이기도 하다. 

아래 문단에서는, NGO로서 어떤 목표를 가지고 있는지, 

그리고 그 목표를 이루기 위해 어떤 철학과 운영방식을 가지고 있는지 되돌아보게 된다.

조직의 덩치를 키우는 것이 목적이 아님을 기억해야 할 것이다.)

 

Building WaterSHED as an institution was never one of our goals. Many NGO leaders believe such ends to be important to elevate their organizational credibility and convening power, all in service of greater effectiveness. Such organization-building goals may be very appropriate for certain groups—for instance, locally funded civil society organizations (CSOs) can justify investing in themselves as institutions (and not having an exit plan) if they persist at the behest of local constituencies and are locally funded. But international NGOs funded with foreign aid are not local CSOs. I’m convinced development would be stronger if convening power were derived much more from ideas than from budget. Donors could help lead that change. 

 

(Convening power가 예산이 아니라 아이디어에서 나와야 한다, 이 부분은 

스크린이 종이었다면 아마 구멍 뚫리게 밑줄 그어댔을거다.) 

 

 

For WaterSHED’s staff, understanding that their tenure was time-bound undoubtedly had the potential to create anxiety. After all, our jobs would be gone. With the exception of a minority who considered this appealing, most had to be persuaded that a successful exit was a rare accomplishment of which we should collectively be proud. The WaterSHED HR team did an excellent job of proactively supporting staff in their career planning. They offered CV and job-interview training and brokered connections with companies and other organizations that could leverage the talent and experience of our staff. (생략)... 

 

(처음부터 Exit을 표방했으니 직원들이 당연히 불안해하겠지. 

WaterSHED는 이런 점을 고려하여 HR을 통해 직원들의 Career planning을 지원했고, 직원들 중에는 사업 종료 후에 WaterSHED의 경험을 바탕으로 정부나 다른 영역에서 일을 할 수 있는 기회를 얻게 되었다고 한다.)

Why Don’t More NGOs Plan Their Exit?

NGOs—and their donors, staff, suppliers, service providers, and beneficiaries—all have incentives that conspire against and inhibit proactive thinking about the endgame.

In my experience, many implementers can be persuaded by the logic of exit-planning—in theory—but myriad exceptions lead them to think it is either impractical or inappropriate in reality. The exceptions are often related to two problems: 1) confusing development with relief; and 2) equating “absence of need” with local readiness and capability.

 

(이론적으로는 이해하지만 실제 적용하는데는 한계가 있거나 적절하지 않다는 지적에 대해서

저자는 그들이 개발과 구조를 혼돈하거나

필요의 부재를 지역의 준비성과 능력을 동일히 사는데서 문제가 발생한다고 한다.

아래는 그냥 한 번 쭉 읽어볼 만해서 생략하지 않고 그대로 붙여넣기함)

 

1. Development Is Not Relief

That development differs from disaster relief is uncontroversial. But surfaces can be deceiving. Charities—either those founded by someone who witnessed deprivation, or those dealing in poverty sensationalism—are prone to label any pressing need as a humanitarian crisis. It is imperative for them to reflect on how endemic poverty fundamentally differs from the effects of conflict and natural disaster. NGOs need to be diligent about identifying the threshold when they're no longer responding to crisis events, like Haiti's earthquake or Cambodia's genocide, and are instead hindering the establishment of long-term solutions. That threshold likely arrives subtly and incrementally, often obscured by acute, visible needs. And whether the same organization is capable of transitioning from relief to a development assistance model (that addresses the structural, system-level changes and that requires an exit plan) is another question.

 

2. “Absence of Need” Is Not the Indicator of Sufficient Local Capacity

Listening to NGO leaders, it’s clear that many do place emphasis on improving local capacity rather than solely delivering services. To the extent that this strengthens the local system, it’s a huge step in the right direction for sustainable development.

However, the signal they’re often waiting for—to know that local systems are ready, and their job is done—is the absence of need. This is an enormous flaw. Essentially there’s an implicit assumption that local readiness will be heralded by universal achievement of a development vision. But if that were true, then no government on earth would be considered capable of managing its own social, environmental, health, or any other issues. If governments were deemed ready for development assistance to stop only when social problems were eradicated, then they likely never would be. And since NGO leaders know, deep down, that the eradication of poverty is not a realistic, time-bound goal, they do not bother drawing up credible plans for their exit.

The Goal Is Local Capacity

Aspirational visions for development must be complemented—or even replaced—with aspirational capacity goals. From their slogans and vision statements, most large NGOs aim for a universal condition or an unmeasurable quality: Oxfam’s “a world without poverty,” Care’s “a world of hope, inclusion, and social justice, where poverty has been overcome and all people live in dignity and security,” or Save the Children’s “a world in which every child attains the right to survival, protection, development, and participation.” These goals are noble. But because they are inherently subjective and unattainable, their proponents escape accountability. This type of goal subtly justifies the delivery of services forever; that which is normally expected from an agency of government as the true duty-bearer. Any other organization delivering ongoing social services is effectively acting as an unelected agency of government. 

 

A more realistic set of goals would have a local government attaining sufficient capacity—within a given timespan—to sustainably advance the well-being of its entire population, even in the face of shocks and shifting targets.

In the case of WaterSHED, we had an aspirational goal that everyone in Cambodia should be able to access a toilet. But it was coupled with an explicit commitment to strengthen the local system, and an explicit commitment to exit within a predefined time period, after which the local system would progress towards the goal without WaterSHED’s involvement.

 

(목표가 local capacity 이어야 한다는 것은 정말 크게 공감이 된다.

사업 성과지표 방식도 재고 해야 한다. 

눈에 보이는, 그럴 듯해 보이는 성과도 중요하지만

결국은 Local capacity - 지역의 역량을 강화하는 일이 제일 중요하고, 

지역의 역량이 강화되지 않으면 아무짝에도 소용이 없다.)

 

No Conditions

It might seem that I’m advocating that NGOs monitor local readiness in order to identify the optimal moment to disengage. But waiting for a green light, based on a set of prescribed criteria, is neither practical nor desirable:

1. Reliable metrics that are valid across contexts may never emerge. Developing better indicators of the quality of host-country systems is definitely worthwhile and may, over time, offer incrementally better guidance. But the complexity is daunting, and it’s likely that any indicators would be context specific. Continuing business-as-usual in the absence of a perfect assessment mechanism is no better than continuing on until need is eliminated.
2. Conditional exits are tentative and susceptible to spurious delay. Since assessing local readiness is complex and subjective, any set of exit criteria that adequately reflect the nuance will give too much space for wavering on the commitment to exit. Alternatively, simplifying the criteria for exit may be no better. Clear criteria can perversely show how exits can be delayed as much as they show how exits can be achieved. The vested interests that can conspire against NGO exits are real—hundreds of billions of dollars are involved.
3. Conditional exits are less likely to accrue the benefits of planning and communicating described above. Exits that are suddenly triggered can run afoul of donors, beneficiaries, and local government, and even suffer accusations of abandonment. Plan International’s departure from Sri Lanka in 2020 is a case in point. The NGO’s program had displaced public funding and created many dependencies, making its sudden exit highly disruptive. Plan later admitted the exit was badly executed, blaming inadequate stakeholder communication and poor exit criteria.(이하 생략)... 

조건없이 단호한 Exit -출구전략의 필요성을 강조한다. 조건부 Exit은 결국 의존성만 높이게 된다. 그간 내가 해왔던 사업을 되돌아 보고 여러가지 생각을 하게 한 좋은 글이어서 나중에라도 다시 읽고 싶어 기록으로 남김.